A leader for Muhammadiyah's global opportunities

Ridho Al-Hamdi
The Jakarta Post

Makassar   /   Wed, August 5, 2015   /  06:06 am

The nation'€™s second-largest modernist Muslim organization, Muhammadiyah, is from Aug. 3 to 7 holding its first post-centennial national congress since its establishment in 1912. With significant roles in improving health and economic empowerment in the country, in its second century Muhammadiyah should increase its role at the international level.

In April this year a study by the Pew Research Center reported that Islam was projected to have the fastest growth of all religions from 2010 to 2050, when it would be the world'€™s second-largest religion with almost 30 percent of the world'€™s population or 2.76 billion followers.

Meanwhile, by 2050 Christians would have an estimated 31.4 percent of the world'€™s population with 2.92 billion devotees.

Nevertheless, Islamic extremism is a growing global trend, as seen by the spread of the Islamic State (IS) movement in Iraq and Syria and Boko Haram in Nigeria. Unresolved political tensions in the Middle East and North Africa show that the future of democracy in Muslim countries is unlikely to be stable in the years ahead.

This strengthens perceptions in the West that Islam and Muslims are not encouraging democracy.

Since 2005, Muhammadiyah has been led by the scholar Din Syamsuddin for two periods until 2015 and thus the congress will choose a new leader for the next five years. Din'€™s legacy includes first, the success of internationalization of Muhammadiyah'€™s religious propagation.

Second, its boldness in criticizing the government and evaluating its unfair policies.

Third, its capability to become a mediator in various conflicts of both national and international levels.

Fourth is the success in regeneration in its internal networks.

Fifth is the focus of the three pillars of Muhammadiyah in its second century: disaster management, philanthropy and economic empowerment.

A number of problems nonetheless have to be evaluated. First, the weakness of ideological commitment and organizational discipline.

Second, the weakness of Muhammadiyah movements at the grassroots levels.

Third, the lack of integration among its institutions, such as among its schools, universities and hospitals. These three problems have led to infiltrations among Muhammadiyah adherents. For instance, extremism, which encourages violence in the form of suicide bombs and terrorism on behalf of jihad.

Thus Muhammadiyah must focus on two main policies: strengthening internal networks and expanding the dakwah or propagation mission on the international level. In networking Muhammadiyah should concentrate on three agendas. First is the improvement of religious or Koran reading classes with references to the Koran and the Prophet'€™s sayings or hadith, which many devotees seem to have neglected.

Second is the commitment of Muhammadiyah'€™s elites to improving the organization from the national level to the grassroots. Third is the courage of its leaders to execute organizational discipline and to counter all sort of extremist values.

Meanwhile, expanding the dakwah should include providing scholarships for Muhammadiyah'€™s activists and lecturers to study abroad.

Second is establishing special Muhammadiyah branches in numerous countries because of its abundant human resources overseas.

Third is the arrangement of dakwah tours to foreign countries during every Ramadhan.

Fourth is empowering Indonesian migrant workers, particularly in countries and regions with large numbers of these migrants such as Malaysia, Japan, China, South Korea, Taiwan, the Middle East and North Africa.

Fifth is the organization of international youth leadership exchanges.

Muhammadiyah definitely has been addressing distinctive past, present and future challenges. The three last leaders revealed different features as seen from Amien Rais, Syafi'€™i Ma'€™arif and Din Syamsuddin. Nonetheless, today'€™s national and global developments leads to certain characteristics needed by the new leader of Muhammadiyah.

First, the leader should have an international vision, to disseminate Islam'€™s peaceful teachings amid extremist movements. Second, the leader should be an intellectual ulema with sophisticated religious knowledge.

As one of the most influential Muslim organizations, Muhammadiyah needs a leader who can present the substance of Islam and provide enlightenment to social problems.

Third, the leader should have strong capability in organizational management. Muhammadiyah today has more than 12,000 village boards and nearly 4,000 sub-district boards, as well as abundant human and natural resources in education, health, the economy and community empowerment across the country. All these assets require a leader competent to overcome the various differences among them.

Fourth, the leader must have the ability to interpret the teachings of the founder, Ahmad Dahlan, to cope with challenges in Muhammadiyah'€™s second century.

The notion of Islam berkemajuan (loosely: progressive Islam) has to be contextualized precisely in current circumstances.

The future of Muhammadiyah depends on its community or ummah '€” thus congress participants have the responsibility to evaluate and create the policy, agenda and strategy of the organization.
__________________________

The writer chairs the Muhammadiyah special branch of Germany and is researching political parties and good governance for his Phd in political science at the Technical University of Dortmund, Germany.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/05/a-leader-muhammadiyah-s-global-opportunities.html

New chairman wants to protect minorities

• Haeril Halim, Andi Hajramurni The Jakarta Post
  

Makassar   /   Fri, August 7, 2015   /  04:26 pm

New leader: Muhammadiyah’s newly elected chairman, Haedar Nashir, (center) poses with other executives of the organization in Makassar on Thursday. Haedar will hold the position of chairman until 2020.(Antara/Yusran Uccang) (center) poses with other executives of the organization in Makassar on Thursday. Haedar will hold the position of chairman until 2020.(Antara/Yusran Uccang)

New leader: Muhammadiyah'€™s newly elected chairman, Haedar Nashir, (center) poses with other executives of the organization in Makassar on Thursday. Haedar will hold the position of chairman until 2020.(Antara/Yusran Uccang)
A calm and laid-back plenary session at the Muhammadiyah muktamar (national congress) in Makassar, South Sulawesi, endorsed on Thursday sociology professor Haedar Nashir as chairman of the organization for the 2015-2020 term, replacing outgoing leader Din Syamsuddin.

The election of the 57-year-old scholar raised hope that the organization would maintain its stance on protecting beleaguered minority groups, including Shiite and Ahmadiyah, given his track records as a figurehead of the organization'€™s moderate faction.

Haedar, whose wife Siti Noordjannah Djohantini was also elected as the chairperson of Muhammadiyah'€™s women'€™s auxiliary, Aisyiyah, assumed the top position after all 13 newly elected members of the Muhammadiyah board of leadership unanimously agreed to name him the next chairman.

Shortly after his election, Haedar delivered a speech in which he vowed that under his leadership Muhammadiyah would continue giving protection to all minority groups in Indonesia regardless of their faiths and cultural backgrounds as part of the organization'€™s efforts to bring harmonious relations to this multicultural country.

'€œMuhammadiyah has the solution that the majority should protect the minority and at the same time the minority should build a synergy with the majority. We will try to prevent conflicts or mediate any developing conflict. We must protect the minority,'€ Haedar said in his speech at the venue of the national congress at Makassar Muhammadiyah University, in Makassar on Thursday night.

In his speech Haedar also congratulated Nadhlatul Ulama (NU) for electing its new chairman during its muktamar in Jombang, East Java, on Wednesday.

Haedar vowed to further improve cooperation with NU through a number of strategic partnership programs, including campaigns to protect minority groups in Indonesia.

Haedar also pledged that Muhammadiyah would continue to stay neutral in the country'€™s politics.

'€œMuhammadiyah will stick to its stance of not having an alignment with political parties in the country and will not establish any political party in the future. As an independent organization Muhammadiyah will maintain communications with all political parties,'€ Haedar said.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah'€™s new secretary-general, Abdul Mu'€™ti, said that Haedar was elected in a unanimous decision.

'€œIt only took the board of leadership 10 minutes to make its decision on the chairmanship and secretary-generalship.'€

Haedar topped the list of preferences of the 13 new Muhammadiyah board of leadership members polled on Wednesday after 1,974 out of 2,389 congress participants voted for him to sit on the board. Mu'€™ti came in fourth place with 1,802 votes.

A political analyst from the State Islamic University (UIN), Syarif Hidayatullah Fuad Fanani, said that Haedar and Mu'€™ti, whom he considered moderates, were the perfect pair to lead Muhammadiyah.

'€œPak Haedar is good at internal bureaucratic reform to deal with internal affairs in Muhammadiyah, while Pak Mu'€™ti is a good at international relations,'€ Fuad told The Jakarta Post.

Meanwhile, Muhammadiyah observer Kim Hyung-jun from Seoul National University said that he believed Haedar and Mu'€™ti would keep their promise to protect minority groups in Indonesia. '€œThey are both moderate figures,'€ Kim said.

In a separate election, Haedar'€™s wife Siti was reelected as Aishiyah chairperson after being elected earlier to the women'€™s organization'€™s board of leadership during its congress in Jakarta.

Header and his wife repeated the feat achieved by Muhammadiyah'€™s founder, Islamic cleric Ahmad Dahlan, in 1912 when he was elected to lead Muhammadiyah, while his wife assumed the top post of Aisyiyah.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/08/07/new-chairman-wants-protect-minorities.html

Is Indonesian Islam too big to fail?

Syafiq Hasyim
Director of the International Center for Islam and Pluralism in Jakarta

Jakarta   /   Fri, June 9, 2017   /  11:44 am

This aerial view shows Indonesian Muslims gathering at Jakarta's National Monument Park as part of a rally against Jakarta's Christian Governor Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, better known by his nickname Ahok, on December 2, 2016. More than 100,000 Indonesian Muslims protested on December 2 against Jakarta's Christian governor, the second major demonstration in a matter of weeks as conservative groups push for his arrest on accusations of insulting Islam. (AFP/File)

The above question is addressed to those who still believe in the strength of Indonesian Islam post-Jakarta gubernatorial election and the verdict of two years’ imprisonment handed down to Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, the outgoing Jakarta governor.

Indonesian Islam refers to Islam that is progressive, moderate and respectful of the diversity of ethnicities, beliefs and cultures that support democracy in the country.

For many years, local and international observers have felt confident about the authority of Indonesian Islam. The mushrooming of Islamic conservatism and radicalism has not been considered threatening enough to shrink the dominance of moderate and inclusive Islam.

The dominant role of the largest Islamic organizations, Nahdathul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, in Muslim communities is often used as reason for this optimism. Is this thesis still valid?

Indonesian Islam has been socially and politically attempted and strived for by those who believe in compatibility between Islam and democracy.

However, many elements of Indonesian Islam are too self-confident about the long supremacy of Indonesian Islam.

The source of this conviction is often the history of Islam’s entry to this country. It is often said Islam in Indonesia is different from Islam in the Middle East owing to its historical process, which was not through war and bloodshed but through peaceful penetration.

Thus, many of us take for granted and feel satisfied that the progressive and moderate characteristics of Indonesian Islam would never be defeated by the different version of Islam in this country.

Such historical evidence is very important, however not enough to maintain and sustain Indonesian Islam. It is questionable and to some extent no longer relevant.

Now, Indonesian Islam has begun to lose ground on account of an aggressive counter from “the different version of Islam” — stemming from the tendency of especially urban folks demanding an Islam that is more ideological, formalistic and operational in politics. More Indonesian Muslims want Islam as their main identity in politics, culture and lifestyle.

This tendency had been detected long before the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election, although many of us apparently ignored it. Many attempts at “sharia-zation” (inclusion of sharia in the legal, political and public sphere) has run systematically and strategically since the Reform Era.

When attempts aimed to make Indonesia a sharia-based state failed in 2002, the strategy of the sharia movement turned into a cultural movement, by conditioning Indonesian Muslims to embrace more sharia-inspired lifestyles such as halal economics and consumption.

Indonesia now has the 2014 law on halal product assurance as well as the 2008 law on sharia banking.

The halal and sharia economic movement is a step further toward the establishment of sharia as the legal and political system. Its propagators use a direct connection strategy to the grass roots, including through social media.

Its messages stimulate emotions of being Muslim, including the social gap and injustice experienced by many Muslims.

At a different level, the propagators of Indonesian Islam are not really aware of and to some extent dismiss this new environment and contestation in coining the meaning of Islam. Such “progressive” Muslims seem to be ignorant and overconfident.

The NU and Muhammadiyah, which are expected to be bastions of moderate Indonesian Islam, have been too busy bargaining for power in the government, and care less for their communities.

In addition, both organizations rely heavily on the state for being the guardians of sustainability of democracy and benign Islam.

Sometimes, the NU is very critical of the antidemocratic movement, but theirs are often lone voices. In short, the consolidation of Indonesian Islam tends to indicate their failure.

Interestingly, those who need “more formalistic, ideological and political Islam” are intensively mingled with populist issues. They have shown adequate flexibility to blend their campaigns with issues of social and economic injustice.

Although religious sentiment remains very important for their movement, the groups have indicated their ability to consolidate networks and to gain a stronger grip on the Muslim grass roots.

Combining populism with identity based politics has been very successful, as indicated by two results; first, the loss of Ahok-Djarot Saiful Hidayat in the recent Jakarta election and second, their pressure on Ahok’s trial that resulted in a two-year sentence for blasphemy.

What should be done by Indonesian Islam to overcome this circumstance?

Indonesian Islam should not mimic the strategy used by those who believe in Islamic formalism, ideology and politics.

For instance, using populism as the tagline of its struggle would lead to tyranny by the majority. Indonesian Islam instead aims for reduced segregation between the majority and minority.

Indonesian Islam should not use identity politics because doing so could lead to discrimination. Unfortunately, reflecting on the recent Jakarta gubernatorial election, today’s Indonesian Muslims in general seem to love both populism and identity politics.

In fact, Ahok’s case has stimulated the sentiment of Islamic populism and identity politics. Indonesian Muslims who have been recognized as open and tolerant are becoming more ethnic and religion-oriented.

If Indonesian Islam does not want to fail in mainstreaming its religious discourse, it must find ideas and idioms that can regain cleverly and responsibly the support of Indonesian Muslims.

If not, the notion that Indonesian Islam is too big to fail is just a claim.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the official stance of The Jakarta Post.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/academia/2017/06/09/is-indonesian-islam-too-big-to-fail.html

Medina Charter, Pancasila, & Dār al-ʿAhdi wa al-Syahādah: Three Concepts on the Relationship between Islam and the State

Seminar Nasional Kebangsaan on “Relasi Islam, Negara, dan Pancasila”, Unsyiah, Banda Aceh, 5 November 2018

 

Pergulatan Islam Berkemajuan

Kasman Singodimejo: Santri Nasionalis Berkemajuan

Kasman Singodimejo: Santri Nasionalis Berkemajuan

Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah: Muhammadiyah’s Contemporary Ijtihād of Siyar and Pancasila

Bachtiar, Hasnan. 2018. Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah: Muhammadiyah’s Contemporary Ijtihād of Siyar and Pancasila. MA Thesis, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University.

Abstract

This thesis examines the concept of Siyar that has been developed by Muhammadiyah, especially in the context of nation-state, globalisation, and the post-9/11 and post- reformation era of Indonesia. In 2015, Muhammadiyah proclaimed the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah, which means the state of Pancasila as the state of consensus and witness, as a representation of the Siyar. This thesis fills three gaps of study: first, Siyar, which has been developed in the Arab- Islamic traditions, has not been studied in the context of Southeast Asia, and especially Indonesia, a non-Arab country with the largest Muslim population; second, academic works on the specific topic of Muhammadiyah produced in Western universities have not discussed the Muhammadiyah’s view of Siyar; and third, the studies that have focused on Siyar have not yet dealt with discourse on contemporary Indonesian politics and especially Muhammadiyah’s place in it.

This thesis combines library research, and social and historical contextualisation. This combination relies on primary sources consisting of official documents of Muhammadiyah, academic and intellectual works of its elites and research publications, and secondary sources that consist of scholarly works on the specific issue of the Muhammadiyah conceptualisation under study. This analysis is supported by interviews with key persons in Muhammadiyah elites who have contributed to the development of the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah.

The thesis finds that Muhammadiyah conceptualises the notion of Negara Pancasila sebagai Dār al-‘Ahd wa al-Shahādah as an intellectual reconciliation between the state ideology of Pancasila and the doctrine of Siyar. This notion is based on its fundamental basis of thought called Islam Berkemajuan (progressive Islam), whereby Islam should be viewed progressively as a problem-solving religion. This effort, in Muhammadiyah’s perspective, is ijtihād which primarily aims to solve the problem of the significant spread of conservative and radical Islamism. In its view, this problem can potentially lead to national disintegration since the Islamists have questioned the status of Indonesia as a state (because it is not dar al-Islam or an Islamic state) and its political system (it is not a Sharī‘ah system). In this context, Muhammadiyah argues that Indonesia is the state based on Pancasila (Negara Pancasila), and since Pancasila was conceptualised through the national consensus by its founding fathers, Indonesia should be understood as the state of consensus (dār al-‘ahd) – that is, neither the Islamic state nor the state of war. 

Through this argument, Muhammadiyah emphasises that it supports a moderate Islamic concept of democracy. Accordingly, it adds the concept of dār al-shahādah (the state of witness) which suggests that all Indonesians should become witnesses to the development of Indonesian civilisation. Its approach of ijtihād – ‘theologising democracy’ – proposes developing democracy as a paradigm built on a theological interpretation of Islam that emphasises the importance of values such as shūra (people’s sovereignty or consultation) and ‘adālah (justice), among others. It is, in this way, viewed as having potential for the future development of interreligious relationships and as a model for the ‘dynamisation’ of Islamic law. 

Ideopolitor: Peran Strategis Muhammadiyah dalam Dinamika Sosial-Politik Bangsa

Ideopolitor: Peran Strategis Muhammadiyah dalam Dinamika Sosial-Politik Bangsa

Kaum Muslim Modernis

Kaum Muslim Modernis

Muhammadiyah rejects National Santri Day

• The Jakarta Post The Jakarta Post
  

  /   Tue, October 20, 2015   /  04:40 pm

Haedar Nashir (center)(Kompas.com/Indra Akuntono) (center)(Kompas.com/Indra Akuntono)

Haedar Nashir (center). (Kompas.com/Indra Akuntono)
Indonesia's second largest Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, has rejected the government's plan to declare Oct. 22 as National Santri (Islamic boarding school students') Day, arguing that such a declaration could spark controversy among Indonesia's Muslims.
The rejection was stipulated in a letter to President Joko '€œJokowi'€ Widodo dated Oct. 19 signed by Muhammadiyah chairman Haedar Nashir.
Religious Affairs Minister Lukman Hakim Saifuddin is scheduled to attend the event at Istiqlal Mosque. The reason for selecting Oct. 22 as the National Santri Day was based on a fatwa made by Nahdlatul Ulama founder Hasyim Asyari on Oct. 22, 1945, that defending the nation was an obligation for each Muslim. The fatwa was made when Indonesia struggled to defend its independence from the Dutch colonists.
Haedar said he could understand that President Jokowi wanted to fulfill his campaign promise and to recognize the role of Muslims during the independence struggle. '€œBut declaring a National Santri Day could spark sectarian groups in our society, weaken national integration and revive old religious sentiments,'€ Haedar said in his letter.
He said that Islamic communities, including Muhammadiyah, have tried to minimize and even eliminate sectarian groups that were counterproductive to the efforts to strengthen national unity.
'€œThe decision to select Oct. 22 [as a national holiday] could spark controversy because it would belittle the role of other Islamic communities, who did not take part in the event related to Oct. 22,'€ he added.
Religious Affairs Ministry'€™s education directorate general Komaruddin Amin said that his office had received a copy of Muhammadiyah'€™s letter.
He said the government would go ahead with the plan, saying that such a rejection was only due to a different point of view.
'€œPak Haedar Nasir may have a different socio-analysis from the President about the matter,'€ Komaruddin said. (bbn)(++++)

https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/20/muhammadiyah-rejects-national-santri-day.html

Minority groups and Islamic humanitarianism

• Hilman Latief The Jakarta Post
  

Yogyakarta   /   Fri, July 5, 2013   /  10:48 am

Indonesian Muslims have been witnessing two contrasting phenomena about humanitarian issues that Islam ironically promotes and upholds.

First, we have seen the proliferation of humanitarian NGOs working on relief and humanitarian actions in disaster affected areas. A number of faith-based NGOs were founded by various Muslim groups and have worked to provide assistance for man-made and natural disaster victims. The proponents of Muslim NGOs attempt to interpret and materialize the fundamental social and humanitarian issues that Muslims should accomplish, such as providing assistance to those in need, lending a hand to refugees and empowering the disadvantaged groups of society.

Second, we have also unfortunately witnessed an incident reflecting a different story when minority Shiite Muslims from Sampang in Madura were driven out from their own village several months ago. Then, as displaced people, they were forced to be evacuated for a second time from their refugee camp because of pressure from hard-liners. The already displaced Shia group was forced to leave Madura by
fellow Muslims.

One may wonder: What is going on with Indonesia'€™s Muslims? Or, to borrow Martin van Bruinessen'€™s expression, where is the smiling Indonesian Islam? Does Islam teach how to protect people in need, refugees and (man-made) disaster victims? More importantly, how is Islam talking about humanitarian issues and how humanitarian principles are conceived by Muslims?

Of course I do not intend to answer those questions instantly and thoroughly. But I think it is necessary for Indonesian Muslims to rethink and reinterpret their humanitarian views, principles and actions in Indonesia'€™s plural society.

More than 1 billion Muslims with distinctive cultures and traditions are found in many parts of the world. Yet until now, in the age of nation states, only a few attempts have been made to formulate Islamic humanitarian principles, which some observers have referred to as '€œIslamic humanitarian law'€, which can become a common ground for Muslims around the globe to take humanitarian action.

What seems to be intriguing though, in relation to the notion of humanitarianism in contemporary Muslim societies, is the fact that the intricate and ambiguous relationship between the Muslim world and the West remains prevalent. This exacerbates the bid to build a mutual understanding between the two great civilizations. One of the most noticeable examples is the way in which the Muslim world and the West perceive each other and put themselves in opposing positions.

As a matter of fact, Islamic doctrines of jihad and war still stimulate heated debates in the West. In relation to this, Western '€œliberal'€ views and '€œsecular'€ ideas, including the context of conceiving humanitarian issues, are not entirely accepted by Muslim societies. Western domination in global politics may also weaken the relationship and at the same time may justify '€œclashes'€ between the two civilizations.

The complex relationship between Islam and the West is due to the delicate global geopolitical landscape, where the meaning of humanitarianism is contested. At present, humanitarian issues have been shaped not only by international communities who are active in relief projects, but also new actors (i.e. groups or organizations) whose social and religious backgrounds and political leanings vary. The social and political complexities in national and international arenas have also put the long-held concept of '€œhumanitarian law'€ in a situation where particular religious and political groups, especially in Muslim countries, may attempt to contest, both discursively and practically, certain claims made in prevailing laws.

Nearly all countries and humanitarian activists agree to ideas of protecting human dignity and humanitarian activists are often urged to reframe and reinterpret their understanding of humanitarian principles, ethics of war and justice. Senior advisor to the International Committee for the Red Cross Ameur Zemmali, who has studied Muslim perceptions of International Humanitarian Law (ILW), suggests that a number of distinguished Islamic scholars in countries like Pakistan, Yemen, Morocco, Jordan and Iran apparently become aware of the necessity to incorporate the spirit of Islamic law into a broader context of humanitarianism.

According to Zemmali '€œthe commonalities between IHL and Islamic law'€ and '€œthe protection of civilians'€, prohibition of humiliation and promotion of humanitarian values have become major concerns for Islamic scholars.

Unfortunately, although Indonesia has frequently witnessed communal conflicts, none of the Indonesia'€™s Muslim clerics have been able to seriously formulate Islamic humanitarian law and sharia in order to prevent the severe impact of conflicts as well as to protect refugees, non-combatants properly. While some Muslim scholars try to reinterpret and reformulate the essence of sharia to suit the current social, economic and political needs, conservative views and rigid interpretations of sharia seems to have dominated the mind-set of some Indonesian Muslims. The issuance of Islam-based ordinances on certain aspects of social life in society seems to have not touched on major issues such as human rights, protection of minority groups and international humanitarian law.

We are indeed amazed by the increasing roles of Islamic humanitarian organizations in Indonesia, which have shown their progressive understanding of humanitarian issues. At least, practically, Islamic humanitarian NGOs have coped with a wide array of social projects. Yet, we also do believe that reinterpretation and contextualization of the meaning of humanitarian principles in Indonesia'€™s many plural societies is imperative.

The concept of '€œimpartiality'€, which has often been reinforced by Islamic humanitarian NGOs, can be contested and even questioned if their humanitarian action and vision are not adequately equipped with the willingness and ability to protect disadvantaged groups like minorities who are, in fact, less protected by Indonesian laws.

Above all, it remains necessary to formulate basic concepts of humanitarian law and principles in Muslim societies. A new reading and reexamination of Islamic concepts that relate to the promotion of public welfare is also needed in order to meet the current social, economic and political challenges in Indonesia, as a culturally and religiously diverse country.

I believe that, in the absence of efforts to strengthen a more inclusive and universal concept of humanitarianism, Muslim humanitarian actors will be heavily characterized by sectarian views that limit their ability to promote the universality of Islam and will gradually lose their role in the nation'€™s quest to overcome the very complex and multi-dimensional problems of communal and
sectarian conflicts.

The writer, a lecturer at Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, is director of the Institute for Development and Social Movement Studies.

https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/07/05/minority-groups-and-islamic-humanitarianism.html

Mitsuo Nakamura

Mitsuo Nakamura

Pluralism, Liberalism and Islamism: Religious Outlook of Muhammadiyah

Studia Islamika 2018 (forthcoming)

Ahmad Najib Burhani

ISEAS – Yusof Ishak Institute; LIPI – Indonesian Institute of Sciences, Jakarta

Abstract

Muhammadiyah has been perceived as an example of a success blend of Islam and modernity. By adopting modern ethics of discipline, equality, and hardworking, this organization has become a rich and independent movement. Quantitatively, the number of Muhammadiyah’s educational and health institutions is only surpassed by the ones owned by Indonesian government. It has 177 colleges and universities; thousands of higher, middle, and elementary schools; and hundreds of hospitals and other health institutions. Social, educational, and economic success of certain organization, however, does not necessarily indicate that it also embraces pluralistic value and religious tolerance. This paper, therefore, intends to describe Muhammadiyah’s position in the context of pluralism, liberalism, and Islamism. This paper argues that Muhammadiyah is progressive in the context of social services, but exclusive in the context of theology. It is its concern on social services that has been able to neutralize Muhammadiyah from Islamist inclination and fundamentalist tendency.

Keywords: Puritanism, liberalism, Islamism, Muhammadiyah, pragmatism, religious exclusivism.

Abstrak

Muhammadiyah kerap dipandang sebagai contoh sukses dari perpaduan antara Islam dan kemodernan. Dengan mengadopsi semangat disiplin, kesejajaran, dan kerja keras, Muhammadiyah telah menjadi organisasi yang kaya dan mandiri. Secara kuantitatif, institusi pendidikan dan kesehatan yang dimiliki oleh Muhammadiyah hanya diungguli jumlahnya oleh institusi yang dimiliki oleh pemerintah Indonesia. Muhammadiyah memiliki 177 perguruan tinggi; ribuan sekolah tingkat atas, tingkat menengah, dan tingkat dasar; serta ratusan rumah sakit dan balai kesehatan. Namun demikian, kesuksesan dalam bidang pendidikan, kesehatan dan ekonomi tentu saja tak mengindikasikan bahwa bahwa organisasi itu juga memegang nilai pluralisme dan toleransi keagamaan. Karena itu, artikel ini ingin mendeskripsikan posisi Muhammadiyah dalam kaitannya dengan pluralisme, liberalisme, dan Islamisme. Artikel ini berargumen bahwa Muhammadiyah merupakan organisasi yang progresif dalam kaitannya dengan pelayanan sosial, namun eksklusif dalam hal teologi. Kesibukan Muhammadiyah dalam memberikan pelayanan sosial menjadi faktor yang berhasil menetralisir organisasi ini dari keterjebakan dalam Islamisme dan fundamentalisme.

Kata Kunci: Puritanisme, liberalism, Islamisme, Muhammadiyah, pragmatisme, keberagamaan, eksklusivisme.

 

Muhammadiyah & Islamic Development in Indonesia

“Muhammadiyah & Islamic Development in Indonesia”, Jaringan Nusantara Regional Conference on “Islam & Development: Towards Democracy & Social Justice”, organised by IRF; NUS; IKMAS-UKM; & CRCS UGM, 23-25 March 2018, Palm Garden Resort, Putrajaya, Malaysia.

Muhammadiyah has been perceived as an example of a success blend of Islam and modernity in Indonesia. By adopting modern ethics of discipline, equality, and hardworking, this organization has become a rich and independent Islamic movement. Quantitatively, the number of Muhammadiyah’s educational and health institutions is only surpassed by the ones owned by Indonesian government. It has 177 colleges and university; thousands of higher, middle, and elementary schools; and hundreds of hospitals and other health institutions. Social, educational, and economic success of certain organization, however, does not necessarily indicate that it also embraces democratic value and religious tolerance. In the recent political dynamics, for instance, some members of Muhammadiyah have inclined to support Islamist groups or defended Islamist activists. This can be seen from their participation in the Aksi Bela Islam (Defending Islam Action), their defense of and protection for Ustadz Bachtiar Nasir, and their opposition to the ruling of the Constitutional Court on Penghayat Kepercayaan (Believers of Faith).

This paper, therefore, intends to explain Muhammadiyah’s position in the context of development, democracy, and religious tolerance in Indonesia. This paper, firstly, overviews the historically undisputed concern of Muhammadiyah on social services and then, secondly, it moves to discern its cultural transformation since the Congress in Aceh 1995, and based on that, thirdly, it analyses its responses on religious issues that occurred in 2017: The banning of the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI), the recurrent controversy on PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), and the ruling of the Constitutional Court on Penghayat Kepercayaan.

This paper argues that Muhammadiyah’s social position has been consistently guided by its long-held theology of Al-Ma’un (kindness) which has inspired its tremendous social and economic achievements. Muhammadiyah’s stand on religious issues, however, was often steered by Islamist imagery of the domination of Islam in Indonesia which has certain impacts on it position on democracy and tolerance towards religious minorities. It is the hegemony of the theology of Al-Ma’un that has been able to neutralize Muhammadiyah from Islamist inclination and fundamentalist tendency. It brings the members of Muhammadiyah to be more realistic in seeing the world and distancing themselves from utopic vision of caliphate or the dream of sharia as the Messiah that will solve every problem or the temptation to create an Islamic state.

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