Ormas Islam dan usaha kesejahteraan sosial: Pendidikan dan perlindungan anak di lingkungan Muhammadiyah

Fuaida, Lisma Dyawati. 2006. Ormas Islam dan usaha kesejahteraan sosial: Pendidikan dan perlindungan anak di lingkungan Muhammadiyah. In Bunga rampai Islam dan kesejahteraan sosial, ed. Kusmana, 161-78. Jakarta: PIC UIN Jakarta.

Abstrak
Pemakalah mendiskusikan salah satu contoh peran institusi agama Islam, Muhammadiyah, dalam usaha kesejahteraan sosial dalam hal pendidikan dan perlindungan anak di Indonesia di lihat dari sisi kebijakan lembaga. Secara normatif makalah ini menegaskan bahwa telah ada usaha yang dilakukan oleh organisasi massa Islam di Indonesia. Secara khusus, Muhammadiyah yang menjadi fokus pembahasan, ditegaskan telah memiki peran yang cukup penting baik dalam bidang pendidikan maupun usaha kesejahteraan sosial, termasuk di dalamnya usaha perlindungan anak.

Kesimpulan
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Di negara yang mayoritas penduduknya agama Islam seperti di Indonesia ini dengan masalah kemiskinan yang belum teratasi dan sederet kasus-kasus naas yang menimpa kehidupan anak-anak, kekuatan Islam sangat dituntut dalam upaya perlindungan anak, tentu saja tidak selalu dalam makna eksklusif hanya untuk umat Islam saja akan tetapi juga seluruh anak Indonesia umumnya. Di sini, kepekaan ormas Islam dalam merespon hal tersebut termanifestasi dalam struktur atau institusi dan kebijakannya yang sensitif akan hak-hak anak. Terdapatnya Pembina Kesejahteraan Sosial (PKS) `Aisyiyah dan Majelis Kesehatan dan Kesejahteraan Masyarakat (MKKM) Muhammadiyah serta Lembaga Kemaslahatan Keluarga Nahdlatul Ulama (LKKNU) sekedar contoh yang mencerminkan bahwa ormas-ormas tersebut sudah memberikan wadah yang luas untuk melakukan program-program perlindungan dan pelayanan terhadap anak. Perlindungan terhadap anak 1) dari keadaan darurat atau keadaan yang membahayakan; 2) dari kesewenang-wenangan hukum; 3) dari eksploitasi, termasuk tindak kekerasan (abuse) dan penelantaran; dan 4) dari diskriminasi, telah dilakukan oleh, misalnya, Muhammadiyah dan `Aisyiyah melalui pelayanan dan bantuan yang diberika melalui panti-panti asuhan untuk anak yatim, yatim-piatu dan terlantar; rumah singgah untuk anak-anak jalanan; pelayanan anak jalanan berbasis keluarga (rumah) untuk anak-anak jalanan yang memiliki keluarga; dan pusat-pusat anak (children center) untuk anak korban bencana alam.
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New Directions in Muhammadiyah

Retrieved from: Feener, R. Michael. 2007. Muslim legal thought in modern Indonesia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp: 204-10.


Because of the dynamic development of some sectors within the ‘traditionalist’ pesantren community over the past three decades, the NU has attracted substantial outside scholarly attention in recent years. This represents a significant shift from the situation prior to that when the NU was of little interest to most foreign observers. Writing in 1985, Francois Raillon remarked on the unusual scholarly work of Allan Samson at that time, whom he characterizes as arguing “that Western scholars only know NU through the unfavorable views of reformist Muslims. So far NU has failed to correct this negative image, and it still has little communication with non-Muslims.”Shortly thereafter, however, a dramatic sea-change occurred as the NU became not only more deeply involved with foreign NGOs, but also the subject of the work of a number of international scholars who formed strong ties with many of those involved in the organization’s pesantren as well as its politics. In a paper recently presented at Singapore, Greg Fealy has critiqued this trend (and even his own involvement in it), cautioning that it has resulted in a tendency for observers to overlook developments in other sectors of the IndonesianMuslim community, including the Muhammadiyah.

Doing so would be a considerable oversight in a treatment of contemporary Indonesian Islamic thought, as over the past few years internal movements for the reform of Muhammadiyah have also made significant contributions toward the revitalization of Islamic intellectualism in contemporary Indonesia. At the forefront of this has been a group of young thinkers and activists, many of whom have come through the IAIN and have thus been exposed to a broad range of ideas on Pembaharuan, contextualization, and Fiqih Sosial in their studies of Islam. While they remain a somewhat marginal constituency of the Muhammadiyah at large, their work has found support from various sectors within the organization, and particularly in the grass-roots activist circles associated with Moeslim Abdurrahman.

In his 1995 book entitled Islam Transformatif Abdurrahman voiced a critique of the current state of the Muhammadiyah and called for a reorientation of the movement in order to more responsibly fulfill its founding mandate for religious revival and social transformation. In the essays published there, he rebuked the organization for directing overwhelming attention to the modernist obsessions with ‘peripheral matters’ such as the audible pronunciation of niyya, and the permissibility of men and women shaking hands. Beyond this, however, he also challenged what he considered to be the elitist nature of Islamic modernism as well as the tendencies toward the ideologization and politicization of Islam that he sees as having led to the spread of reactionary conservatism within ‘modern reformist’ organizations such as Muhammadiyah. In looking for ways to overcome these problems, Abdurrahman drew inspiration from the work of critical Muhammadiyah scholar Kuntowijoyo (d. 2005) in seeking a new, ‘profetis’ format for the social sciences that could be put into the service of ethical endeavors for the improvement of society. This, Abdurrahman argues, would require cooperative efforts with preachers, `ulama, and social scientists to transform the umma through the application of new, socially engaged ideas on religion and society. To further their work of “collective ijtihad ” he calls for the establishment of a new center for the study of Islam, complete with an information center and library facilities for documentation. He has since begun some work in that direction himself on a modest scale in a converted house that now serves as the headquarters for a group calling themselves the Young Muhammadiyah Intellectual Network (Jaringan Intelektual Muhammadiyah Muda/ JIMM).

Abdurrahman has become a kind of mentor for younger thinkers and activists associated with JIMM intent on transforming theMuhammadiyah from within with an emphasis on social engagement. In describing the project of JIMM in the preface to a collection of essays produced by its members, he has highlighted what he sees as three major characteristics: (1) a new openness of approach to hermeneutics; (2) an emphasis on ‘liberation’ and ‘resistance to hegemony’ and (3) a sense of practical engagement with “the New Social Movement.”78 Despite such over-arching characterizations, however, JIMM itself is internally diverse, some of its members have even come to it from out of NU backgrounds.Most of those affiliated with the movement share an intellectually imaginative orientation toward Islam and an affinity for grass-roots social activism. They pursue these interests through an array of overlapping methods ranging from forms of social critique building upon the work of Gramsci, as well as that of Roman Catholic liberation theologians, to new models of scriptural exegesis and a critical re-evaluation of the ways in which conceptions of gender are operative within the ideals and institutions of Muhammadiyah.

In ways that, in their rhetorical form, reflect concerns within the NU to create a model of Post-traditionalism, the young activists associated with JIMM call for the development of a Post-Puritan vision for the Muhammadiyah. For example, Abd. Rohim Ghazali and Zakiyuddin Baidhawy have called for a reappraisal of Muhammadiyah’s fundamental concern with what its adherents commonly refer to as ‘TBC’ (Takhayul, Bid`ah, and Churafat). Rather than seeing the real targets of reform as these ‘imaginations, innovations, and superstitions (respectively)’ in religious beliefs and practices, the thinkers and activists associated with JIMM argue for a new, religiously based critique of such ‘idolatrous’ dangers to the community as “corruption, nepotism, and the cult of individualism.” Thus in place of whatMoeslim Abdurrahman has critiqued as a stultified emphasis on da`wa as a form of ‘propaganda’ JIMM directs its work toward the development of what have come to be referred to as ‘alternative cultural da`wa’ strategies that are both ‘new’ and at the same time true to their understandings of the “original, dynamic vision of Muhammadiyah” put forward by the organization’s founder K. H. Ahmad Dahlan.

Moehammadyah and "Terug naar Koran en Soennah"

"Moehammadyah" in Blumberger, John Theodor Petrus. 1931. De nationalistische beweging in Nederlandsch-Indië. Haarlem: H.D. Tjeenk Willink & Zoon. pp. 90-101 and 339-347.

Het snel toenemend wereldverkeer van technischen en geestelijken aard heeft niet nagelaten allerwegen grooten invloed uit te oefenen op het godsdienstig, politiek en sociaal stelsel van den Islam. Door veelvuldige aanrakingen met andere godsdiensten en religieuze opvattingen, met moderne wetenschappelijke instellingen en methoden, heeft het veelomvattend stelsel van den Islam, zooals het is opgebouwd op den grondslag van den Koran (Allah's eigenwoorden, aan Mohammad geopenbaard) en de Soennah (ten rechte ,,Hadith", d. i. overlevering betreffende het doen en laten van den Profeet en van zijn gezellen), zich moeten aanpassen aan de onafwijsbare eischen der wereld-evolutie.

Vooruitstrevenden onder de Moslims, die den tijdgeest beseften en vele der in de Fikh-boeken van de vier scholen — Sjafiietische, Hanafietische, Malikietische en Hanbalietische — gegeven interpretatiesdergewijde teksten als belemmeringen gevoelden voor de maatschappelijke evolutie, riepen allengs luider: ,,Terug naar Koran en Soennah", met terzijdestelling van allerlei verstarde regelen der plichtenleer, vastgelegd door de vier Imams, hoofden diet rechtsscholen. Zelfstandige bronnenstudie (..idjtihad"), buiten de Kitabs om, was echter volgens de orthodoxie ongeoorloofd; immers zou dat beteekenen aantasting van het gezag der Imams, aan wier autoriteit de rechtzinnigen zich hadden te onderwerpen (,,taklid").

... Leider dier beweging was Kjahi Hadji Ahmad Dahlan, die moderne leerstelh'ngen verkondigde op het gebied van het onderwijs aan Islamieten, ook aan vrouwen en meisjes. Zijn godsdienstige propaganda (,,tablegh") ontmoette heftig verzet van de zijde der orthodoxe gemeente. De energieke Dahlan liet zich daardoor niet afschrikken! Op 18 November 1912 richtte hij een vereeniging op, onder den naam ..Moehammadyah", met het doel het wereldsch onderwijs te bevorderen op godsdienstigen grondslag en de eenheid en de kracht van den Islam te versterken. De vereeniging representeerde den wereldwijzen modernen ,,santri", die door veelvuldige aanrakingen met de buitenwereld in zijn handel en zijn bedrijf zich bewust was geworden van de sleur, waarin de Islam was vervallen; die zich opmaakte om zijn godsdienst op te heffen door de dogmatische en wettelijke beginselen zooveel mogelijk te doen aanpassen aan veranderde levensomstandigheden. Zoo kan Moehammadyah eenigermate worden aangemerkt als te behooren tot de reformistische Islam-beweging uit de school van Moehammad Abdoeh, den Egyptischen Sjeich, die beoogt den Islam te bevrijden van de banden, welke actieve deelneming aan den vooruitgang van den nieuwen tijd bemoeilijkten.

Muhammadiyah and the Modernization of Indonesian Women

Baried, Baroroh. 1986. "Islam and the Modernization of Indonesian Women." in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon Siddique. Islam and Society in Southeast Asia. Singapore: ISEAS. pp. 139-154.

... Aisyiyah was one of seven women’s organizations which exercised the initiative to hold the first Indonesian Women’s Congress in 1928, when the Aisyiyah representatives was chosen as a vice-chairman. Its task within the Muhammadiyah was to help women to fully understand what is meant by the injunction to practice Islam as a way of life. Women were to be educated for the purposes of carrying out such religious duties as performing the five daily prayers, fasting, paying the religious tax (zakat) and going on the pilgrimage. Women must understand virtue and why they are not justified to commit adultery, to cheat, to tell lies, and so forth. Muhammadiyah invited Aisyiyah to guide Muslim women to purify their faith in God, using the Holy Qur’an and the Hadis (Traditions of the Prophet) (p. 147).

…

Aisyiyah stresses that in the modernization process, Indonesian Muslim women must be responsible for the welfare of their families as well as the welfare of the community. Achieving this requires that women to work together in women’s organizations. Aisyiyah’s activities in the fields of religious teachings, education, social welfare, and economics demonstrate that Indonesian Muslim women are able to work together for their mutual benefit. To accomplish this task they must sometimes leave their homes and families, and devote themselves to community service. Such organizations as Aisyiyah are contributing to the modernization of the Indonesian women (p. 153).

Muhammadiyah, Salafism, and conservatism

Quoted from: Eliraz, Giora. 2004. Islam in Indonesia: modernism, radicalism, and the Middle East dimension. Brighton: Sussex Academic Press.

This organization [Muhammadiyah] was described at the end of the 1970s as “the most powerful living reformist movement in Muslim Southeast Asia, perhaps in the entire Muslim culture” (p. 21).[1]

The Islamic modernist movement, significantly influenced by `Abduh’s heritage, made a strong, vivid impact in the Malay-Indonesian world early on. In contrast, in Egypt `Abduh’s heritage dissolved quite early on into various and contradicting conceptual trends, ideologies, and movements. Its elements were to be found almost everywhere in Egypt in the first decades of the first twentieth century, and were echoed in almost every ideological and intellectual discourse, debate, and conflict that took place at the time in Egypt. Prominent among these conflicts were those that resembled the major cultural and theological debates going on in the Malay-Indonesian would, such as modernity versus tradition, and the determination of the collective national identity. But at the same time `Abduh’s heritage, with many of its authentic characteristics, did not exist there as a solid, vivid corpus of ideas, and definitely not as a formidable organizational reality, as the Muhammadiyah organization has been in Indonesia (p. 18).

It must be noted that from a later historical perspective, beyond the boundaries of the formative period and into recent decades, Muhammadiyah, in Indonesia, is alleged to show more of a link with Rashid Rida’s salafism than with the modernist ideas of `Abduh, and has adopted a position of “neo-salafism”, including an ideological emphasis on a return to pristine Islam and strict Scripturalism (p. 20).[2]

The traditionalist NU is regarded as more liberal, tolerant, and confortable with the idea of a secular state, as well as with syncretic patterns of Islam.[3] This can be partly explained by the fact that NU’s followers are mainly from the rural areas of Java, and as much they share the Sufi tradition of tolerance, and are also influenced by Javanese Hindu-Buddhist and animist traditions to a certain degree. Muhamadiyah has become more conservative in strictly Islamic terms and there are still some people within this movement who bid for a greater role for Islam in the Indonesia polity (86).

It must be noted that it is among modernist Muslims that many of the present day Islamic radical organizations in Indonesia have their origins (p. 78).[4]

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[1] Peacock, Purifying the Faith, p. 6.

[2] M. Din Syamsuddin, Religion and Politics in Islam: The Case of Muhammadiyah in Indonesia’s New Order (Ph.D. dissertation, Los Angeles: University of California, 1991), pp. 268-70, 287-8; M. Din Syamsuddin, “The Muhammadiyah Da`wah and Allocative Politics in the New Order Indonesia”, Studia Islamika, vol 2, no. 2 (1995), pp. 63-4. See also Azra, “The Transmission of al-Manar’s Reformism”, p. 97.

[3] Robert W. Hefner, “Print Islam: Mass Media and Ideological Rivalries among Indonesian Muslims”, Indonesia, 64 (October 1997), p. 86. See also van Bruinessen, “Geneologies”, pp. 123, 127.

[4][4] ICG, Indonesia: Violence and Radical Muslims, p. 11; ICG, Al-Qaeda in Southeast Asia, pp. 3-4.

Ahmad Dahlan, Muhammadiyah, and Christianity in Indonesia

Quoted from: Boland, B. J., and I. Farjon. 1983. Islam in Indonesia: a bibliographical survey, 1600-1942, with post-1945 addenda. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Foris Publications Holland.

“The Reverend D. Bakker arrived in Central Java in 1900 and was a lecturer at the theological college in Yogyakarta from 1906… After an initial brief communication on Muhammadiyah in 1915 a more important article was published by him in 1922. In it he mentions the possibility of friendly relations between Christians and members of Muhammadiyah, in particular Ahmad Dahlan, the founder of Muhammadiyah. He further plead for the serious study of Islam within the missions, stating that, while Islam may have a great many prejudices against Christianity, ‘we for our part are not always fair towards Mohammedanism’, so that ‘a sound knowledge of Islam’ is required (p. 262)” (pp. 43-4).

F.L. Bakker, D. Bakker’s son, also wrote about Muhammadiyah: “In 1925 he confirmed his father’s report (D. Bakker 1922) that Muhammadiyah had been not unsympathetic towards Christianity and Christians until the death of Dahlan in 1923, when the situation had changed under the influence of H. Fachruddin, who placed a stronger emphasis on the renewal and strengthening of Islam in Java vis-à-vis Christianity” (44).

Of the third generation of Yogyakarta Bakkers, there was a younger D Bakker attached to the Theological College in Yogya as a lecturer in the 1950s…For there was yet another Bakker living in Yogya at the same time, who should not be confused with the above three, namely Father J.W.M. Bakker SJ, the current Jesuit authority on Indonesian Islamic affairs (p. 45).

Quite different were the personality and work of H(endrik) Kraemer (ae as a in English ‘came’)… He had by that time become Professor of the History of Religions with the theological faculty at Leiden and come to be considered as an expert on Islam (though he is not to be confused with J.H. Kramers –a as a in English ‘arms’--, who was Professor of Arabic and Islam at the University of Leiden at the same time, and who provided a new Dutch translation of the Koran)… his article ‘Culture, Politics and Religion’ (1935b), in which he remarks with reference to Muhammadiyah, in the footsteps of D. and F.L. Bakker, that the broad-mindedness of Dahlan gave way after the latter’s death to an aggressive rejection of the West and Christianity (pp. 45-6).

Muhammadiyah, Kraton Yogyakarta, Garebeg Mulud, and Sekaten

Quoted from: Woodward, Mark R. 2011. Java, Indonesia and Islam. Dordrecht: Springer.

Yogya nationalism transcends religion. Even Christians and many members of the modernist Islamic organization Muhammadiyah, which has strong fundamentalist tendencies, are devoted subjects.30 So much so that Muhammadiyah members from other parts of Indonesia often say things like: “Muhammadiyah can never really be Muhammadiyah until it stops being part of Yogyakarta” (p. 11).

Muhammadiyah tolerates the Yogyakarta Malud and justifies it continued performance by defining it as kebudayaan instead of agama. An elderly Muhammadiyah woman who ran a food stand at the 2009 Malud explained that: “Agama descends from God, and so of course we can not change it. But this is kebudayaan and it is not perfect like Islam and we change it every year to make it better”... In Yogyakarta it is impossible for Muhammadiyah to condemn the Malud, because the Grand Mosque of the Sultanate is also the “Mother Mosque” of Muhammadiyah. In 2009, Dr. Din Syamsul Din, the General Chairman of Muhammadiyah and other of the organizations’ leaders, endorsed it as a means of uniting the Indonesian Muslim community and as an opportunity for Muhammadiyah Muslims to demonstrate their love and respect for the Prophet Muhammad (p. 170-1).

Perhaps the most significant change is that the slametan for nobles and officials has been moved from the mosque to the palace. It is now held on the day of the Garebeg after the distribution of the gunungan. A high ranking official explained that this change was necessary because the Penghulu does not approve of slametan and would be unhappy if pusaka to be brought into the mosque because he is a Muhammadiyah member, He continued that the purpose of the Sultan’s visit to the mosque was to honor the Prophet, the Penghulu and the santri community and that the ritual must, therefore, fit with the spirit of the times. This theme was echoed in a sermon delivered at Sekaten in 1979. The speaker was a prominent Muhammadiyah theologian. He explained that gamelan, the Javanese shadow theater, and the Garebeg Malud are permissible because they are expressions of Javanese culture (kebudayaan) and that they heighten awareness of an important Muslim holiday, but that unspecified non-Islamic customs should be eliminated. The speaker took great pains to emphasize both the purity of the reformist community and the religious acceptability of customs many consider to be bid’ah (p. 189).

Muhammadiyah interpretations of the changes vary but fall into two basic categories. Some see them as signs that the Sultan supports the movement. Others see them as an attempt to circumvent the reformist program by employing a simpler, though still unacceptable, Javanese ritual performance. Despite these uncertainties, Muhammadiyah have attached indexical symbols of its own to the Sekaten fair. Qur’an recitations and sermons are broadcast over loudspeakers. There are also banners and information booths describing the social, educational, and religious programs of Muhammadiyah and other Muslim organizations (p. 189-90).

Muhammadiyah and Fatwā on the Indonesian Communist Party

Quoted from: Boland, B. J. 1971. The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia. The Hague: Nijhoff. Pp. 145-146.

“An influential Muslim told me that in Java (perhaps in Central Java) a fatwā of the Muhammadiyah chairman had been a great significance in the extermination of the “Gestapu/P.K.I.”, because in this fatwā it was stated that their destruction ought to be considered a religious duty. The informant was probably referring to the statement issued at an emergency meeting of the Muhammadijah held on November 9^th- 11^th, 1965, in Djakarta.[17]

From this period, there are more statements known, made by Muslim leaders who declared this conflict to be a “Holy War”. This Muhammadijah statement, however, can be taken as an authoritative example.”

Under the heading Ibadah dan Djihad (Religious Duty and the Holy War), this statement explains that the action on September 30^th, 1965, is to be regarded as an extension of the Madiun Communist rising of 1948. Officers such as Untung, Latif, Supardjo, Bambang Supeno and others are said to have been involved in the Madiun Affair. Therefore this time a decisive follow-up ought to be carried through in order to prevent a third Communist attempt at a coup in the future. The statement continues as follows:

“Therefore it was right for the Muhammadiyah, together with [the leaders of] its youth movement, during an emergency meeting in Djakarta, November 9^th-11^th, 1965, trusting in God (tawakkal), to make this pronouncement: THE EXTERMINATION OF THE GESTAPU/PKI AND THE NEKOLIM IS A RELIGIOUS DUTY.[18] … This religious duty is not (only) recommended (sunnat) but obligatory (wadjib), even an individual obligation” (wadjib `ain…) … “And because this action and this struggle must be carried out by consolidating all our strength –mental, physical and material—therefore this action and this struggle are nothing less than a HOLY WAR (DJIHAD). This Holy War, according to religious law, is not (only) recommended, but obligatory, even an individual obligation…” Finally it is stated –in accordance with Islamic law—that when carrying out this djihad “destructive excesses, defamation, revenge, etc. must be prevented”.

It is not explicitly stated what interpretation the (modern) Muhammadijah at that moment gave to the term djihad. But the conclusion drawn by the average Muslim as well as his enemy can easily be guessed. It is, however, hard to assess to what extent this fatwā had a result similar to that which earlier “djihad resolution” had on events in Surabaja in November 1945.

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[17] Published in Suara Muhammadiyah, no. 9, November 1965.

[18] “NEKOLIM” is a SOekarno abbreviation for “neo-colonialist imperialists”; they, too, were not forgotten in this statement!

Soekarno, Islam, and Muhammadiyah

Quoted from: Boland, B. J. 1971. The struggle of Islam in modern Indonesia. The Hague: Nijhoff.

[The Muhammadiyah bestowed title for Soekarno as] “Faithful Member and Great Support of the Muhammadiyah” (p. 133)

pp. 126-27

In Bencoolen (Bengkulu, Sumatra), where Soekarno had been taken by the colonial government in 1938, he came into contact with the reform movement and became a member of the Muhammadijah, where he found opinions at least partly acceptable to him.

However, Soekarno probably wanted to give a more radical interpretation of “the spirit of Islam” than many reformers. On the one hand, the point on the reformers’ programme concerning the “purification” of Islam from all superstition would not have interested him much. On the other hand, Soekarno could be called a true liberal. He was certainly more interested in the new world than in Islam. In his interpretation of Islam, he always emphatically repeated the slogans of Muslim apologists, such as “Islam is progress”, “no religion is more rational than Islam”, “Islam insists on scientific research”, “the science of Islam is knowledge of the Qur’an and Tradition plus general knowledge”, “the Qur’an and Traditionmust be interpreted with the help of general scholarship”, and so on.[1]

What Soekarno envisaged was certainly not a “return to the Qur’an and Tradition” in the way the salafiya reformers wanted to return to the pure belief of “the ancestors” (Ar. aslāf, sing. salaf). For Soekarno, the revolutionary, there was no “return”. Islam had to catch up its thousand years of backwardness. “Not back to the early glory of Islam, nt back to the time of the caliphs, but run forward, catching up with time (chasing time), that is the only way to get glory again.”[2] Does not Soekarno’s criticism sound like “Turkish” criticism of the Arab glorification of the past?[3]

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[1] A small collection of sayings by Soekarno is given in Solichin Salam, Bung Karno dan Kehidupan Berpikir dalam Islam, Djakarta 1964.

[2] Salam, Bung Karno, p. 91. When speaking of “catching up with time”, one must realize that the Indonesian expression ketinggalan zaman (obsolete, out of date) literally means that something is “left behind by time”.

[3] Compare Smith, Islam, p. 164ff.

The Indonesian Muslim women’s movement and the issue of polygamy: the `Aisyiyah interpretation of Qur’an 4:3 and 4:129

Mudzakkir, Rof'ah. 2005. "The Indonesian Muslim women’s movement and the issue of polygamy: the `Aisyiyah interpretation of Qur’an 4:3 and 4:129." In Abdullah Saeed. Approaches to the Qur'an in contemporary Indonesia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-192.

Rof’ah Mudzakir

Lecturer at UIN Sunan Kalijaga Yogyakarta, Indonesia

The interpretation of the Qur’an cannot be separated from its context, in which political, social and economic factors play a role. An exegete living within the values of his or her own time and place is heavily influenced by these factors. In understanding the interpretation of the Qur’an, therefore, one should always consider the context of the text. This study considers the above hypothesis by examining the interpretation of the tow Qur’anic verses relating to polygamy, namely Q. 4:3 and 4:129, offered an Indonesian Muslim women’s organization, the `Aisyiyah, the women’s wing of the Muhammadiyah. One of the largest Muslim organizations in Indonesia, the Muhammadiyah was founded by Ahmad Dahlan in 1912 in Yogyakarta.

Indeed, in the history of the Indonesian women’s movements that emerged in the late nineteeth century, the issue of polygamy occupies an important position. Its importance lies in the fact that polygamy continues to be viewed as a barrier to the key objective of the women’s movement –that is, to modernise and improve the position of Indonesian women, both culturally and legally. It is not surprising, therefore, that since the first Indonesian Women’s Congress in Jakarta in December 1928, a fierce debate on polygamy has continued in Indonesia. The debate on polygamy has even led women’s organizations to disagree among themselves. While most organizations have decided to support the abolition of polygamy, some continue to support it, or at least to not reject the practice outright. In this debate, Muslim women’s groups represent the latter category, while Christian and non-religious organizations have chosen to contest the very validity of polygamy. Considering the importance of this issue in the Indonesian women’s movement, it is interesting to observe how Islamic groups justify their refusal to support the abolition of polygamy. In this article, we will examine why this is so, focusing on the `Aisyiyah.

The `Aisyiyah was founded on 22 April 1917 by Ahmad Dahlan in the expectation that this organization would help the Muhammadiyah, and act as a partner in promoting the Muhammadiyah’ ideas of Islamic reform. Thus, ideologically speaking, the establishment of the `Aisyiyah was based on Ahmad Dahlan’s belief that women and men are equal in the eyes of God. Considering this belief, it is not surprising to see that, in the early days of its existence, the `Aisyiyah changed the manner of participation of Muslim women in religious activities. Praying in the mosque, receiving religious training, and even wearing the veil were all signs that women (just like men) could publicly participate in religious observances. These kinds of activities were introduced by the `Aisyiyah as something that Muslim women had not experienced before.

Viewed from a wider perspective, the `Aisyiyah is no different from other women’s organizations in Indonesia which have attempted to represent women’s interests and have struggled for their advancement. However, as the female wing of the Muhammadiyah, this group has been one of the biggest Muslim women’s organizations in Indonesia. In 2002, the `Aisyiyah had 194,722 members throughout 30 provinces. More than other women’s groups, the nature of the `Aisyiyah as a mass-based group has allowed its activities to touch the grassroots level of society. Indeed, the role of the `Aisyiyah is not limited to religious activities. Its main concerns are more oriented towards social and community development, with women as the particular target, focusing on issues such as education, health and charitable activities. In fact, this organisation’s great contribution to Indonesian society can be seen in its establishment of hundreds of educational institutions, thousands of mosques, and hundreds of health centres and orphanages all over Indonesia.

Due to its role and nature, the `Aisyiyah has been described as representative of Indonesian Muslim women. It is important, therefore, to observe its response to the issue of polygamy. Another factor contributing to the significance of the `Aisyiyah in the discourse on polygamy is the development of the organisation’s arguments in justifying the practice of polygamy. Interestingly, rather than being the product of purely religious reasoning, this development is more affected by the social and political context of Indonesia. Thus, it is this point that is the main concern of this article.

Competing in Goodness: Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama

in: Doorn-Harder, Pieternella van. 2006. Women shaping Islam: Indonesian women reading the Qur'an. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. Pp. 50-83

Indonesia is a vast country, and “Indonesian Islam” comprises a variety of interpretations concerning the role of Islamic law, methods of interpreting the holy sources, and opinions about religious pluralism and local cultures. This chapter looks at some of the main representations of Islam in Indonesia. It tries to locate the organizations of Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama within this spectrum in order to understand how their religious propensities have contributed to their teachings on gender issues.

…The santri do not form a clear-cut group but represent several groups of committed Muslims. Their commitment to Islam may lead them to follow mystical, normative, or Islamist interpretations and practices.

Another way to discern santri is to look at their modes of interpreting Islamic scriptures and their degree of accepting local culture. Following these lines, we may identify four groups: 1) traditionalists; 2) reformists or modernists; 3) renewalists, who combine traditionalist and reformist teachings; and 4) Islamists, also referred to in Indonesia as radicals, fundamentalists, literalists, and extremists. (pp.50-1)

The “Shari`ah mindset,” however, is not the prerogative only of radical groups. Within Muhammadiyah and NU, some leaders have opinions that could be labeled as “extreme.” In its desire to Islamize society and in its methods, Muhammadiyah is akin to the Muslim Brotherhood… (p. 56)

In trying to understand the position of Muhammadiyah and NU in the Indonesian Islamic landscape, it becomes clear that the terms “reformism” and “traditionalism” do not connote black-and-white versions of Islam. The reality is far more complex. Liberal and extremist members flourish in their midst. Muhammadiyah has adopted many aspects of the Indonesian culture and has developed a new identity in comparison with the original, puritanical reformist movement that came from the Middle East. NU’s continual modernizing has produced some of the most innovative leaders of Indonesian Islam in the twenty-first century. At the same time, distinct differences remain between the two modes of interpreting Islam, differences that can never be completely abolished (p. 83).

Women of Muhammadiyah

Pieternella van Doorn-Harder

Doorn-Harder, Pieternella van. 2006. Women shaping Islam: Indonesian women reading the Qur'an. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.

Studying the women’s efforts, one readily concludes that they have had an enormous impact on Indonesian society. During the past two decades, Indonesian allegiances have shifted to a middle ground: Muslim believers are less interested in traditionalist Fiqh-based reasoning and have little patience for extended Javanese rituals, but the somewhat rigid Muhammadiyah patterns are not entirely acceptable either. In this middle ground, some students have become interested in the Islam Baru groups, and others study Sufism, but the majority is simply traying to be more conscientious in practicing their religion, fasting regularly, reading the Qur’an, and learning about Islam. During this process of renewed Islamization, `Aisyiyah preachers were ready, preaching, teaching, and providing Islamic alternatives for the indigenous rites of passage in the life cycles of women and children. At birth, `Aisyiyah midwives knew the correct religious formulas to whisper in the baby’s ears; at death its leaders prepared a woman’s body properly for burial. They performed the rituals in simple, economical ways that saved time and money, precious commodities in Indonesia, now and in the past. The upshot was that women gained understanding of the Islamic rituals and principles without having to delve into the time-consuming practices traditionalists followed….

`Aisyiyah women live their lives at the fault lines of interpretation about what it means to be a “good Muslim woman.” While trying to strengthen a woman’s position, they espouse the view that women complement men. With this primary tenet in mind, its programs make sense. Women working side-by-side with men can bring about the true Islamic nation. But the togetherness has its limits. Women can and do help build hospitals, elementary schools, and universities; but when directors of such programs are chosen, they have to stay in their own quarters with the clinics, preschools, and nursing colleges. They addressed the plight of women via the harmonious family model but had to perform hermeneutic acrobatics to create a spouse who complements her husband, yet is equal in some sense.

This lack of consistency does not go down well with younger feminists, male and female, so we see a storm of criticism over the family program. In their indignation, many of its critics forget the benefits the harmonious family has brought to thousands of women. Paradoxically, the criticism is a sign of `Aisyiyah’s success: it impresses on women the importance of knowing the Islamic sources that define their role and position. Students of the sources took them to a higher level; now they not only read the texts but reread them as well. And while rereading, they demand clear answers to their questions about gender, not unclear reformist talk that dodges the difficult points (pp. 127-9)

Chapter on "Women of Muhammadiyah" pp. 87-130