Dedicated to boosting research and scholarship on the Muhammadiyah and strengthening this movement
Friday, January 27, 2017
Tuesday, January 24, 2017
Visi Kosmopolitanisme Islam di Lingkungan Jaringan Intelektual Muda Muhammadiyah
Teosofi: Jurnal Tasawuf dan Pemikiran Islam
Vol. 5 No. 2 Desember 2015
Hasnan Bachtiar, Haeri Fadly, dan Moh. Nurhakim
Abstract
This paper tries to diagnose the vision of Islamic Cosmopolitanism toward the circle of Young Intellectual Muhammadiyah Network (JIMM). Through the perspective of social diagnose of the tradition of Mannhemian sociology of knowledge, it finds that JIMM has their own intellectual stand amongst some humanity discourses and ideas such pluralism, multiculturalism, bhinneka nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Elaborations among these discourses and ideas are played in order to serve the sense of social justice and humanity, as well as human dignity in the world. These elaborations are dakwah efforts that want to be a winner in the midst of global civilization constellation. However, in these attitudes, JIMM has foundation of thought which is interpreted into three ways, are: progressive Islam, social liberation, and historical activism. In dealing with very different context of Muslim societies in the contemporary time, Islamic Cosmopolitanism of JIMM attempts to fulfill their mission through the agenda of internationalization Islam berkemajuan and Indonesian Islam.
Vol. 5 No. 2 Desember 2015
Hasnan Bachtiar, Haeri Fadly, dan Moh. Nurhakim
Abstract
This paper tries to diagnose the vision of Islamic Cosmopolitanism toward the circle of Young Intellectual Muhammadiyah Network (JIMM). Through the perspective of social diagnose of the tradition of Mannhemian sociology of knowledge, it finds that JIMM has their own intellectual stand amongst some humanity discourses and ideas such pluralism, multiculturalism, bhinneka nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Elaborations among these discourses and ideas are played in order to serve the sense of social justice and humanity, as well as human dignity in the world. These elaborations are dakwah efforts that want to be a winner in the midst of global civilization constellation. However, in these attitudes, JIMM has foundation of thought which is interpreted into three ways, are: progressive Islam, social liberation, and historical activism. In dealing with very different context of Muslim societies in the contemporary time, Islamic Cosmopolitanism of JIMM attempts to fulfill their mission through the agenda of internationalization Islam berkemajuan and Indonesian Islam.
Monday, January 23, 2017
Lazismu and Remaking the Muhammadiyah’s New Way of Philanthropy
Zakiyuddin Baidhawy
Abstract
This study is aimed to analyze the new way of philanthropy by special reference to Lembaga Amil Zakat Infak dan Sadaqah Muhammadiyah (Muhammadiyah Philanthropic Board: hereafter Lazismu); explore the measures taken by Lazismu to promote empowerment and social justice movements by combining charity and entrepreneurship; and understand the motive of the new philanthropy movement initiated by Lazismu. Through the ‘third way’ approach and analysis, this study found that: first, Muhammadiyah, as a non-profit social-religious organization, admits its role as an agent of transformation vis-à-vis the State. Lazismu is able to show its flexibility to adapt to new trends in philanthropy. Lazismu is also able to initiate breakthrough in management of Zakat, Infaq, and Sadaqah and move them beyond charity activities to productive and redistributive activities to promote social justice and equity. Second, Lazismu shows creativity and sophisticated programs exceeding the expectations of muzakki (alms payer), benefactor, and donors. Realization of philanthropy programs developed by Lazismu extends from education development, agriculture development, youth entrepreneurship, and women empowerment, to Masjid based community empowerment. Third, Lazismu combines theology of love, generosity, and voluntarism to produce transformative philanthropy that is successful to alter charity oriented generosity to creative and innovative good deeds.
[Kajian ini dimaksudkan untuk melihat model filantropi baru pada Lazismu (Lembaga Amil Zakat Infak dan Sadaqah Muhammadiyah); mengungkapkan langkah-langkah yang diambil oleh Lazismu untuk melakukan pemberdayaan dan keadilan sosial; dan untuk memahami tujuan filantropi baru yang digagas oleh Lazismu. Menggunakan pendekatan dan analisis “Jalan Ketiga”, makalah ini menemukan bahwa Muhammadiyah, sebagai organisasi non-profit, mengakui perannya sebagai agen perubahan vis-a-vis Negara. Lazismu mampu menujukkan fleksibilitas untuk beradaptasi dengan mode-mode filantropi baru. Lazismu juga mampu menemukan terobosan-terobosan dalam manajemen zakat, infak, dan sedekah. Lazismu mengelolanya dari sekedar kegiatan kedermawanan menjadi kegiatan-kegiatan produktif dan redistributif untuk mewujdukan kesetaraan dan keadilan sosial. Kedua, Lazismu menunjukkan kreatifitas dan program-program canggih melampaui harapan muzakki, donor, dan penerima. Wujud program filantropi yang dikembangkan oleh Lazismu meliputi pengembangan pendidikan, pembangunan pertanian, kewirausahaan pemuda, dan pemberdayaan perempuan, sampai dengan pemberdayaan masyarakat berbasis masjid. Ketiga, Lazismu mengkombinasikan teologi kasih, kebajikan, dan kerelawanan, untuk mewujudkan filantropi transformatif yang berhasil mengubah kebajikan berorientasi amal menjadi program-program kreatif dan inovatif.]
Keywords
creative-innovative philantrophy; social justice; Lazismu; Muhammadiyah
Full Text:
PDFReferences
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http://www.aljamiah.or.id/index.php/AJIS/article/view/53206
Friday, January 20, 2017
Thursday, January 19, 2017
NU, Muhammadiyah seen as losing their influence
Bambang Muryanto
The Jakarta Post
Jakarta / Fri, January 20 2017 / 12:23 am
The two major rallies led by hard-line Islamic groups in Jakarta late last year reflected the declining influence of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the nation’s largest Islamic organizations, among Indonesian Muslims, analysts say.
The face of Indonesian Islam has changed with the rise of hard-line groups like the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), which spearheaded the rallies on Nov. 4 and Dec. 2 that saw hundreds of thousands of Muslims fill the streets of Jakarta to demand the prosecution of the city’s governor, alleging he had committed blasphemy.
“NU and Muhammadiyah are still seen as influential organizations in the fields of education and health care, but they are no longer seen as the main reference for religious issues,” Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) researcher Ahmad Najib Burhani said during a discussion organized by the Maarif Institute at Muhammadiyah’s headquarters in Yogyakarta on Thursday.
The two organizations had failed to dissuade their followers from taking part in the sectarian rallies against Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, who has been accused of insulting the Quran, Ahmad said.
Instead, NU and Muhammadiyah followers listened to the calls made by other Islamic groups, including the FPI, he added.
The fact that members of the two organizations, who have long been touted by foreign observers as the face of moderate Islam in Indonesia, lend their support to groups like the FPI and its ilk has been seen as alarming.
The rallies came following intense campaigns by the FPI against Ahok, a Christian of Chinese descent, who is seeking a new term through the Feb. 15 gubernatorial election.
Ahok had topped many surveys before he was charged with blasphemy, which he said had been orchestrated by his enemies to block his election bid.
The allegations stemmed from a comment he made during a visit to the Thousand Islands regency in September when he criticized people he said had abused a Quranic verse to prevent Muslims from electing a non-Muslim.
Ahok, who is now standing trial at the North Jakarta District Court, insisted that he did not commit blasphemy against Islam.
“The ‘Defend Islam’ rallies should be used as a yardstick to decide whether or not one has a moderate view of religion,” Ahmad said.
He argued that he had seen a trend in which Muhammadiyah and NU followers had become less moderate and more intolerant. A few years ago, he said, NU members took part in expelling minority Shia followers from Sampang, Madura. While the high-level members of Muhammadiyah championed pluralism, its grassroots members did not, he added.
The landscape of Indonesian Islam is definitely changing, Iqbal Ahnaf of the Center for Religious and Cross Cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University said, adding that the government should quickly address the issue.
Muhammadiyah executive Zuly Qodir admitted that his organization had lost its clout in the political sphere and that the hard-line groups were filling the void. As a result, it had been slow in responding to national issues and the actions of political leaders, he said.
It is hard to determine the exact number of NU and Muhammadiyah followers in the country, but the organizations often claim to have about 70 million and 40 million, respectively.
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/20/nu-muhammadiyah-seen-losing-their-influence.html
The Jakarta Post
Jakarta / Fri, January 20 2017 / 12:23 am
The two major rallies led by hard-line Islamic groups in Jakarta late last year reflected the declining influence of Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, the nation’s largest Islamic organizations, among Indonesian Muslims, analysts say.
The face of Indonesian Islam has changed with the rise of hard-line groups like the Islam Defenders Front (FPI), which spearheaded the rallies on Nov. 4 and Dec. 2 that saw hundreds of thousands of Muslims fill the streets of Jakarta to demand the prosecution of the city’s governor, alleging he had committed blasphemy.
“NU and Muhammadiyah are still seen as influential organizations in the fields of education and health care, but they are no longer seen as the main reference for religious issues,” Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) researcher Ahmad Najib Burhani said during a discussion organized by the Maarif Institute at Muhammadiyah’s headquarters in Yogyakarta on Thursday.
The two organizations had failed to dissuade their followers from taking part in the sectarian rallies against Jakarta Governor Basuki “Ahok” Tjahaja Purnama, who has been accused of insulting the Quran, Ahmad said.
Instead, NU and Muhammadiyah followers listened to the calls made by other Islamic groups, including the FPI, he added.
The fact that members of the two organizations, who have long been touted by foreign observers as the face of moderate Islam in Indonesia, lend their support to groups like the FPI and its ilk has been seen as alarming.
The rallies came following intense campaigns by the FPI against Ahok, a Christian of Chinese descent, who is seeking a new term through the Feb. 15 gubernatorial election.
Ahok had topped many surveys before he was charged with blasphemy, which he said had been orchestrated by his enemies to block his election bid.
The allegations stemmed from a comment he made during a visit to the Thousand Islands regency in September when he criticized people he said had abused a Quranic verse to prevent Muslims from electing a non-Muslim.
Ahok, who is now standing trial at the North Jakarta District Court, insisted that he did not commit blasphemy against Islam.
“The ‘Defend Islam’ rallies should be used as a yardstick to decide whether or not one has a moderate view of religion,” Ahmad said.
He argued that he had seen a trend in which Muhammadiyah and NU followers had become less moderate and more intolerant. A few years ago, he said, NU members took part in expelling minority Shia followers from Sampang, Madura. While the high-level members of Muhammadiyah championed pluralism, its grassroots members did not, he added.
The landscape of Indonesian Islam is definitely changing, Iqbal Ahnaf of the Center for Religious and Cross Cultural Studies at Gadjah Mada University said, adding that the government should quickly address the issue.
Muhammadiyah executive Zuly Qodir admitted that his organization had lost its clout in the political sphere and that the hard-line groups were filling the void. As a result, it had been slow in responding to national issues and the actions of political leaders, he said.
It is hard to determine the exact number of NU and Muhammadiyah followers in the country, but the organizations often claim to have about 70 million and 40 million, respectively.
https://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2017/01/20/nu-muhammadiyah-seen-losing-their-influence.html
Tuesday, January 10, 2017
Dokumen Islam Murni Berkemajuan
Muhammadiyah adalah asimilasi kreatif antara Arabisasi & Westernisasi. Tidak anti budaya asing, tapi menyerapnya secara bijaksana. Muhammadiyah juga merupakan gabungan beragam kultur nusantara & tidak identik dg satu kultur atau etnis tertentu. Inilah karakter Islam Murni Berkemajuan. Gatra 5-11 Jan 2016. Resensi Abd. Sidiq Notonegoro atas buku Muhammiyah Berkemajuan.
Thursday, January 5, 2017
Aksi Bela Islam dan Fragmentasi Otoritas Keagamaan
Koran Sindo, Jum'at, 6 Januari 2017, h. 7
Ahmad Najib Burhani*
Aksi Bela Islam I, II, dan III yang dilakukan pada 14 Oktober
2016, 4 November 2016, dan 2 Desember 2016 merupakan critical event (peristiwa yang sangat penting) untuk melihat
perkembangan keagamaan di Indonesia. Salah satunya berkaitan dengan fragmentation of religious authority
(fragmentasi atau terpecah-pecahnya otoritas keagamaan). Ini diantaranya bisa
dilihat dari anjuran dari Said Agil Siradj, ketua umum PBNU, yang tidak
diindahkan oleh sebagian warga NU.
Siradj menganjurkan warga NU untuk tidak bergabung dalam Aksi
Bela Islam III dan NU bahkan mengeluarkan fatwa bahwa sholat Jum'ah di jalan
raya adalah tidak sah. Alih-alih mengikuti anjuran ini, beberapa pesantren di
Jawa Barat seperti Ciamis dan Tasikmalaya justru mengirimkan santri-santrinya
untuk pergi ke Monas dengan berjalan kaki. Tentu afiliasi keormasan dari
pesantren-pesantren itu perlu dilihat kembali. Namun tidak bisa dipungkiri
bahwa banyak dari warga NU yang bergabung dalam Aksi Bela Islam III.
Apa yang terjadi di NU itu juga terjadi di Muhammadiyah. Anjuran
Haedar Nasir, Ketua Umum PP Muhammadiyah, kepada warganya untuk tidak turun
aksi seperti fall on deaf ears, tak
dihiraukan oleh beberapa anggota Muhammadiyah. Alih-alih mengikuti anjuran
ketua umumnya, banyak warga NU dan Muhammadiyah yang memilih bergabung dengan
Habib Rizieq Shihab, Abdullah Gymnastiar, Arifin Ilham, Bachtiar Nasir, dan
Zaitun Rasmin untuk melakukan aksi yang terpusat di tugu Monas (Monumen
Nasional) Jakarta.
Selama ini Habib Rizieq Shihab, jika dianggap sebagai ulama,
maka ia adalah bagian ulama pinggiran atau ulama jalanan. Dalam istilah
akademik, ia biasanya disebut low-brow ulama
dan sering dikontraskan dengan high-brow ulama
semisal Quraish Shihab dan Ma’ruf Amin. Amin Abdullah sering menyebut Shihab
dan FPI (Front Pembela Islam) yang dipimpinnya sebagai noisy minority (kelompok kecil yang berisik). Bahkan Buya Ahmad
Syafii Maarif sama sekali tak menganggap mereka sebagai ulama. Istilah Buya
untuk mereka adalah para preman berjubah. Namun Aksi Bela Islam III seakan
telah mengubahnya dari orang marjinal dan
peripheral menjadi salah satu tokoh nasional.
Rizieq menjadi khatib dalam sholat Jum'at yang berpusat di Monas
yang secara tak sengaja dihadiri oleh Presiden Jokowi, Wakil Presiden Jusuf
Kalla, Menteri Agama Lukman Hakim Saefuddin, Menteri Polkam Wiranto, Panglima
TNI Gatot Nurmanto, Kapolri Tito Karnavian, dan pimpinan negara yang lain. Pada
hari itu, ia seperti menjadi pimpinan dari jutaan umat Islam Indonesia. Aksi
Bela Islam III seperti telah menyulapnya menjadi tokoh yang tak bisa dikecilkan
atau diabaikan.
Sebelum Aksi Bela Islam III atau disebut juga sebagai Aksi 212,
pemerintah dan juga banyak dari elemen umat Islam bukan hanya tak memandang
Habib Rizieq. Pemerintah cenderung mengacuhkan dan mengabaikannya. Jokowi
berusaha mengontrol suasana dengan mengundang ulama dari NU, Muhammadiyah, dan
MUI untuk datang ke istana negara. Jokowi bahkan mendatangi kantor PP
Muhammadiyah di Menteng dan kantor PBNU di Kramat untuk bertemu dengan pimpinan
kedua organisasi tersebut. Ia bahkan membuat peristiwa penting dengan
menghadiri penutupan Rakernas Pemuda Muhammadiyah di Tangerang. Namun Presiden
mengabaikan atau tidak mau mengadakan pertemuan dengan pimpinan Aksi Bela Islam
yang tergabung dalam GNPF-MUI (Gerakan Nasional Pembela Fatwa - Majelis Ulama
Indonesia).
Setelah peristiwa 212, Rizieq Shihab dan GNPF-MUI seperti tak
ingin kehilangan panggung dan momentum yang telah mengangkat mereka ke panggung
nasional. Diadakanlah Aksi Sholat Subuh Berjamaah pada 12 Desember 2016. Mereka
juga merancang Aksi Bela Islam IV atau yang dalam beberapa meme disebut sebagai Aksi Lempar Jumrah pada 6 Januari 2017 jika
tuntutan mereka agar Ahok dipenjarakan karena dianggap melecehkan Islam tidak
terpenuhi.
Berbeda dari NU dan Muhammadiyah yang memiliki berbagai amal
usaha semisal rumah sakit, sekolah, dan pesantren yang harus selalu diurus,
Shihab dan FPI tidak memiliki lembaga-lembaga semisal itu. Gerakan utamanya
adalah melakukan demonstrasi dan sweeping
tindakan yang dianggap sebagai maksiat dengan menggunakan semboyah "amar
ma'ruf nahi mungkar". Karena tak punya amal usaha, maka tak ada kesibukan
yang menyita pikiran dan tenaganya selain untuk aksi demo dan sweeping.
Selama ini dalam melakukan aksi-aksinya, Shihab lebih banyak
mendapat kecaman dari masyarakat, termasuk dari umat Islam. Momentum 212 telah
mengubahnya dari zero to hero, dari
seorang pecundang menjadi pahlawan. Bahkan beberapa meme yang tersebut di media sosial telah mempersonifikasi sosok
Shihab seperti sosok Umar bin Khattab, sahabat Nabi Muhammad dan khalifah kedua
dalam sejarah Islam yang terkenal dengan ketegasan dan keberaniannya. Karena
itulah, ia ingin terus memelihara momentum tersebut dan membuat gerakan ini
terus bergulir atau jika memungkinkan seperti snow ball yang semakin membesar.
Selain Aksi Sholat Subuh berjamaah pada 12 Desember, Shihab dan
GNPF juga menjadikan semangat 212 sebagai alat kebangkitan ekonomi umat Islam
dengan mengadakan FGD bertema: "Revolusi Ekonomi, Terobosan Ekonomi
Umat". Dan masih dengan semangat 212, ketika MUI mengeluarkan fatwa
tentang atribut yang berkaitan dengan natal, maka sweeping pun dilakukan oleh anggota-anggota FPI di berbagai toko,
swalayan, dan kantor-kantor.
Pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang perlu diajukan berkaitan dengan Aksi
Bela Islam I, II, dan III itu diantaranya adalah: Dalam fragmentasi otoritas
ulama sekarang ini, bagaimana kita melihat peran dan posisi NU dan
Muhammadiyah? Apakah Rizieq Shihab akan terus memiliki peran lebih besar,
pengaruh lebih luas, dan dipandang sebagai tokoh nasional yang diikuti setelah
peristiwa ini? Bagaimana dengan peran media sosial dalam penciptaan fragmentasi
otoritas keagamaan ini? Ini adalah pertanyaan-pertanyaan yang membutuhkan
kajian serius. Ini juga merupakan pertanyaan yang menjadi titik tolak untuk melihat
keberagamaan di Indonesia pada beberapa tahun mendatang.
-oo0oo-
*Peneliti
Senior di Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (LIPI)
http://nasional.sindonews.com/read/1168539/18/aksi-bela-islam-dan-fragmentasi-otoritas-keagamaan-1483668174